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I.  
Introduction
Somewhere in Canada, a shopper sat at home and ordered the latest bestseller from
http://www.bn.com.  While Canadian antitrust authorities pondered whether the Chapters
chain of booksellers constituted a monopoly, our Internet shopper gave lie to claims of
monopolization.  Early internet enthusiasts claimed that "the internet interprets
censorship as damage and routes around it," meaning that the distributed nature of the
web makes the policing of it rather difficult.  DARPANET, the precursor to the internet,
was designed to withstand a nuclear strike against any of its nodes by routing information
around the damage.  Economists specializing in industrial organization theory could as
easily quip that the internet interprets local monopolies as arbitrage opportunities for
careful shoppers, allowing them to route around the higher prices.
While our Canadian shopper waited for her new book to arrive, the European
Commission deliberated whether MCI and Worldcom should be allowed to merge.
Though neither company had a substantial presence in Europe, the EC was able to ensure
that MCI divest its internet backbone infrastructure before the companies could
consummate their merger.  The Commission noted that the proposed merger "between
two US telecommunications companies would have worldwide effects.  The Internet is
global in nature; Internet access and service providers, Internet content providers, end-
customers, all demand universal connectivity to the worldwide web.  …[T]he impact of
1 Commiss ion  of th e Euro pean Parliament 2002, p . 4.
2 Janow 2002, p. 1.
3 Palim, 1998, no tes  th at as  of th e en d of 1996, th e 70 co untries  with  co mpetition  laws  co mpris ed 79% of
world ou tput and  86% of world trade.  More countries have adop ted competition laws s ince then.
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this merger between these two US companies affected not only US consumers but also
inter alia European Union consumers."1 
The two examples highlight the double-edged nature of e-commerce and internet
applications for antitrust.  While the internet massively increases the size of the relevant
market for a host of transactions, subverting would-be monopolists and encouraging
worldwide competition, it also increases the jurisdictional scope of national antitrust
authorities.  Many countries and the European Commission use an economic effects rule
to determine jurisdiction.  Since a website may engage in purely electronic transactions
without knowing where its customers are physically located, it may be subject to the
jurisdiction of dozens of antitrust authorities around the world.
Jurisdiction and extraterritoriality issues are not a new problem in antitrust enforcement.
The 1945 Alcoa decision extended the Sherman Act’s reach beyond America’s borders to
apply to commercial activity affecting American commerce, regardless of its physical
location.  Thus, for example, if prices in the U.S. are affected by commerce occurring
only in foreign jurisdictions, U.S. antitrust law applies.
For much of the twentieth century, antitrust effectively remained an American institution
as few jurisdictions outside America had substantive competition laws; extraterritoriality
problems were mostly found in the enforcement of the Sherman Act beyond the borders
of the United States.  Today, however, over ninety countries have antitrust statutes and
more are drafting competition codes;2 together, over 86% of world trade takes place in
jurisdictions with antitrust statutes.3  In this chapter, we discuss the workings of
international antitrust enforcement, how the internet affects and is affected by antitrust
legislation, and the challenges that internet suppliers and consumers face in the global
antitrust environment.
4 Lips ky, 2002, p. 59.  Lips ky po ints  out that price-fixing g rain dealers could be pu t to death in Periclean
Ath ens , more th an two millennia before th e Sherman Act.  
5 See American Banan a Co . v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909).
6 See United States  v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945).
7 Udin (2001) provides  a good  su mmary of the “effects tes t” and of the cases  that relied on an d further
s trength ened its  ap plication.  See als o Gifford  an d Sullivan (2000).  
8 See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d  (9th Cir.1976).  The Ninth Circuit proposed
certain comity cons iderations  for determination of juris diction.
9 See Hartfo rd Fire Ins . Co. v . California, 509 U.S. (1993).
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II.
International Antitrust
While antitrust was not invented in the United States,4 during most of the twentieth
century it effectively remained an American institution.  For the first half of the century,
the Sherman Act applied only within American borders,5 but the 1945 Alcoa ruling
extended its reach to foreign conduct affecting American commerce.6 Until the early
1990s,  “international antitrust” largely referred to the problems associated with
extraterritorial enforcement of American antitrust law against overseas corporate activity.
Alcoa defined the American stance on the jurisdictional limits of antitrust.  In that case,
Canadian and European aluminum companies colluded to restrict aluminum production,
limiting the amount of aluminum ingot that they would export to the United States.
Judge Learned Hand’s Second Circuit Court ruled that the foreign cartel was subject to
action under the Sherman Act because its activities both intended to and subsequently
resulted in substantial negative effects on American commerce.  This “effects test”
became enshrined in American antitrust law over the latter half of the century.7  While
some rulings attempted to inject comity considerations into the effects test, 8 the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Hartford Fire9 strongly limited the application of comity to those cases
in which foreign law conflicts with American law to such an extent that the foreign
company cannot comply with the statutes of both countries.  Alcoa’s effects test remains
the determinant of jurisdiction. 
Extraterritorial enforcement of the Sherman Act has not gone without complaint from the
foreign jurisdictions affected.  Several countries have put in place blocking legislation to
impede American antitrust enforcement.  Additionally, “claw-back” legislation allows
10 See Canada’s  “Fo reign Extraterritorial Measures  Act” and the Un ited Kingdom’s  “Protection of Trading
Interests A ct”, for example.  See also  “The Protection o f Trading Interests  Act o f 1980: Britain’s Resp ons e
to U.S. Extraterritorial An titrus t Enforcement.”  Journ al  of Interna tion al  Law  an d Business 2:2 (Autumn
1980).
11 Textbooks  discuss ing extraterritoriality and antitrus t include Ball, McCulloch et. al., 2001 and Fo lsom,
Sp anogle and Gordon, 2000.  The interes ted reader may also wis h to consult the Autumn 1980 s ympos ium
iss ue “Trans national Iss ues  in A merican Antitrus t Law” of the Journ al  of Interna tion al  Law  an d Business
for an early  overview o f the topic.  Davidson (1998) discusses  the extens ion of claw-back and blocking
provision s  to  oth er extrate rritorial en forcement actions .  
12 James, 2001, p. 4.  Note, however, Gerber (1998) who argues  that EC competition law is indigenous
rath er th an a U.S. import. 
13 Edwards  (1974), p. 112-3.
14 Palim (1998), p. 105-6.
15 James  (2001), p. 2.
16 ICPA C (2000), p. 2.
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foreign defendants in American antitrust cases to seek damages in their home country’s
courts from the plaintiff in the American antitrust action.10  However, these types of
problems in extraterritorial enforcement are not the main concern of this chapter; they are
now the boilerplate of international business and antitrust textbooks.11  
Of more recent concern is the worldwide proliferation of antitrust statutes.  Assistant
Attorney General Charles James quipped in a recent address that “antitrust has been one
of the United States’ most successful exports.”12  While countries with McDonald’s
restaurants still outnumber those with antitrust statutes, James was not hyperbolizing.  As
recently as 1973, only 27 countries had adopted competition codes.13 As of the end of
1996 that number had grown to seventy, 61% of which had instituted their codes in the
1990s.14  The most recent figures put the number over ninety, with twenty more countries
in the process of drafting codes. 1 5   Because many of these countries’ codes also employ
an economic effects test to determine jurisdiction, any given transaction may be subject
to scrutiny by dozens of antitrust authorities.
The proliferation of antitrust authorities presents far more difficult problems than those
posed by an extraterritorially activist Federal Trade Commission.  Multiple agencies now
can and do claim jurisdiction over a variety of corporate activities, most notably over
mergers.  Over 60 countries now require or provide for pre-notification merger filings.16
Consequently, large merging companies sometimes now need to file such notifications
with over a dozen jurisdictions.  The compliance costs for merging companies can be
17 Paul (2000).
18 James  (2001).
19 Janow (2000), p. 33.
20 See Evenett (2000b) pp. 18-20; Parisi (1999), Janow (2000).  See also  von  Finkenstien’s (2002) address
at the opening conference of the International Competition Netwo rk (ICN).  The ICN provides  a forum in
which co mpetition  ag encies  can co nsult with one an oth er an d develop  “b es t p ractices” recommendations . 
See a lso Janow (2002).  For a  co ntrary pers pective, s ee  Guzman  (1998).
21 See Gifford an d Sullivan (2000), Klein (1997).
22 Gifford  an d Sullivan (2000), p. 116.
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burdensome, especially in cases in which the relevant antitrust authorities provide
contradictory rulings.17
In order to minimize frictions in the application of antitrust laws, the United States has
pursued bilateral agreements with Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Israel, Japan,
Mexico and, most notably, the EC.18  At minimum, these agreements provide for
notification and consultation on cases where the interests of both parties are involved.
Agreements with several jurisdictions, including the EC, also include positive comity
provisions allowing each jurisdiction to request that the other enforce its own laws to
remedy activity taking place within its borders.19  
By most accounts, cooperation between antitrust authorities is strong and growing.20
However, no amount of inter-agency cooperation can prevent conflict when the antitrust
agencies of different jurisdictions have irreconcilable differences regarding the purpose
of antitrust legislation.  Two merger cases involving the U.S. and EC serve here as
exemplar: Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and GE/Honeywell.  In Boeing/McDonnell
Douglas, the FTC determined that the merger posed no anticompetitive threats, while the
EC objected to exclusive supply contracts despite efficiency-enhancing characteristics of
those contracts.21  Daniel Gifford and Thomas Sullivan argue that the EC ruling may
constitute an attempt on the part of the EC to raise Boeing’s costs in order to provide an
advantage to Airbus, the well-connected and well-subsidized European consortium
airplane manufacturer.22  Following EC threats of enforcement action, Boeing abandoned
its exclusive supply contracts.  
Similarly, in GE/Honeywell, strong cooperation between the Department of Justice and
the EC preceded divergent rulings.  Because the merging parties waived confidentiality
rights, Justice and EC shared all information provided by GE and Honeywell.
23 James  (2001), p. 5.
24 James  (2001), pp. 5-6, Lipsky (2002) p. 63.
25 James  (2001) p. 6, citing Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan , 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).  Note , however,
that EC policy may be shifting.  A s  of this  writing, the European Court of Jus tice has  overturned two  EC
merger p rohibitions .  As  a result, Commiss ioner M onti is moving  to wards  reform of the EC merger contro l
process .  W hether this reform proves s ubs tantive remains  to be determined.
26 See Bork (1978), as well as M cChes ney and   Shughart (1995) for more thorough analys is o f American
antitrus t law.
27 See Gifford an d Sullivan (2000) for discu ss ion  of non-efficien cy  goals  in EC, US an d Japan es e antitrus t
law.  
28 Oligopolistic markets are those which are dominated by  a very small number of firms.  In the Bertrand
model, even a market with only two firms will resu lt in the competitive outcome as each firm can win the
en tire market by s lightly underp ricing  th e o th er;  th e result then  is th at  both  firms  price a t marginal cos t.  In
the Cournot model, each firm takes the other’s o utpu t as g iven and  optimizes accordingly; output is h igher
and prices are lower than in the pure monopoly case.
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Consequently, communication and cooperation between the two agencies was
“tremendous.”23  Nevertheless, Justice approved the merger while the EC disallowed it.
While both agencies agreed that the merged company would offer improved products and
lower prices, Justice deemed the resulting efficiencies as justifying the merger while the
EC worried that those efficiencies would harm the merged company’s competitors.24
Assistant Attorney General James contrasts EC competition law with American law by
noting that the purpose of American antitrust laws “is not to protect business from the
working of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the market.”25  While
we disagree with his assessment of American antitrust law,26 the contrast is accurate.
Goals other than efficiency underlie much of European competition law.27
Leaving political considerations to one side for the moment, antitrust policy is based on
economic theory.  And, economists in different parts of the world do not fully agree with
one another.  Karl Aiginger, an economist from Austria, and his co-authors, find that
American economists specializing in industrial organization are more likely than their
European counterparts, for example, to view the behavior of oligopolists as conforming
Bertrand or Cournot predictions rather than pure collusion – that is, to restrict output and
raise price not by as much as would a pure monopolist but, rather, in a non-collusive way
that reflects each oligopolist’s strategic guess about how the other oligopolists in its
industry will behave.28  Consequently, American economists are more likely to be
skeptical of antitrust action in oligopolistic markets.  European IO economists disagree
systematically with Americans on a wide range of questions of importance to antitrust
29 Note Aiginger et. al., “Compared to European IO economists , the Americans  are less  likely to want to
restrict research joint ventu res, more optimistic abou t the pos itive effects of mergers on p rofitability, less
likely to interpret the higher price cos t margins  of large firms as  a cons equence o f market power, so mewhat
less  likely to expect collus ion in marke ts  with only a few firms , more likely to believe that marke t power is
a short run phenomenon, more likely to believe that the importance of predation has  been widely
exaggerated, more likely to believe that cons umer protection laws generally reduce economic efficiency,
more likely to favor reducing the influence of regulatory authorities, less  likely to believe that the
deregulation of telecoms has  lead to new monopolies , more willing to count producers ’ s urplus  in addition
to consumer’s  surplus  in regulatory  policy, less  willing to use competition policy to attack tacit collus ion,
less likely to condemn the exchange of information among competitors, more likely to believe that
international competition has made the regulation o f monopolies and ou tdated po licy, more likely to believe
that effective concen tration has been reduced in the last two decades  by globalization, and less  likely to
th ink o f th e goal of antitrus t p olicy as  ind ucing  firms  to  eq uate  price an d marginal or average co s t.”  (p.XX). 
The authors o f this chapter lie firmly on  the W estern side of the Atlantic.
30 Niels, Gunnar and A driaan ten Kate.  2000  “Predatory pricing s tandards: is there a growing international
cons ens us ?”  The Antitrust Bulletin, Fall.  787-809.  
31 See DiLorenzo (1985).  In the abs ence of foreign competition, antitrus t statutes  can keep dominant
domes tic firms  in check.
32 Shughart, W illiam F., Jon D. Silverman and Robert D. Tolliso n.  1995.  “An titrus t Enforcement and
Foreign  Competition .”  In  McChesney an d Shughart, eds , The Caus es and Consequences  of Antitrus t: The 
Public Choice Perspective.  
33 Palim, Mark R.A. 1998.  “The W orldwide Growth of Competition Law: an Empirical An alys is.” The
Antitrust Bulletin, 43:1 (Spring ), p. 105-145.
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policy.29  Theories long-since discarded in the United States remain quite in vogue
elsewhere.  While American economists and antitrust authorities now tend to be skeptical
of predatory pricing arguments, their European counterparts worry greatly about the use
of predatory pricing.30  Fundamentally divergent approaches to antitrust policy can
quickly arise from these differences.
Additionally, public choice considerations – viewing government officials as being just
as self-interested as are people in the private sector – lend skepticism to public-interest
theories of antitrust regulation.  While recent cases like Boeing point to protectionism as
a driving force behind antitrust enforcement actions, the phenomenon is not at all new.
While antitrust legislation might be seen as a substitute (by ensuring that domestic firms
are subject to vigorous competition) for open international markets,31 the empirical
record does not bear up that analysis.  Instead, antitrust seems to serve as a substitute for
tariffs.  Shughart, Silverman, and Tollison32 find that foreign competition correlates
positively with antitrust agency funding in the United States.  Additionally, Mark Palim33
finds that countries adopting competition codes do not see them as substitutes for
international competition.  The recent proliferation of antitrust statutes occurred during a
wave of globalization and lower tariffs.  This suggests that antitrust statutes might serve
34 Evenett, Lehmann et al., pp. 14-15.
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as an additional method of protecting domestic firms from foreign competition when
other methods of protectionism are waning.34  
III.  e-competition.  Antitrust and the Internet
The only difference between economics and e-conomics is a hyphen.  Economic
principles hold as strongly in a wired world as they do in the world of brick and mortar.
Mythologies have developed around the economics of the internet, some of which see the
internet as demanding more activist antitrust policy, others of which argue that the
internet obviates the need for antitrust.  We find the arguments for strengthened antitrust
enforcement do not hold up to serious scrutiny.  On balance, economic arguments favor
reduced antitrust activity as a consequence of the internet.  However, antitrust is a
political institution and matters politic seem likely to favor increased activism.
Cartels are Restrained in a Global Digital Marketplace
Traditional antitrust concerns surrounding cartels, price signaling, and other violations of
antitrust law can emerge as easily in e-commerce as in traditional business.   However,
the internet can mitigate some of these problems.  Because individual consumers
shopping from home can now quickly access a global marketplace, cartels and price-
fixers must become global in scope to be truly effective; local cartels cannot extract rents
from internet-savvy consumers that are larger in magnitude than shipping costs from
outside the boundaries of collusion.  And as shipping costs fall, the scope for less-than-
global cartelization shrinks – for all a consumer need do to escape a local cartel’s attempt
to charge monopoly prices is to order the desired merchandise or service from outside of
the local-cartel’s geographic area.
35 McKenzie, Richard B. and Dwight R. Lee, 2001.  “How digital economics revises  antitrus t thinking.” 
The Antitrust Bulletin, Summer.  253-98.
36 See Klein (2000) for discu ss ion o f these iss ues .
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Digital Dominance is Checked by Low Marginal Costs
Economists Richard McKenzie and Dwight Lee35 raise interesting caveats for antitrust
analysis in the digital world.  They point out that market dominance cannot be exploited
in digital markets in the same way as in the market for physical products.  A dominant
firm in ordinary markets can increase prices by restricting output; because of their
inability to exploit similar economies of scale, competitors cannot simply increase their
production to make up the difference.  In digital markets marked by infinitesimal
marginal costs of production, competitors can quickly and easily increase output to match
the reduction in the dominant firm’s output.  Should Microsoft attempt to exploit its
dominant position in the provision of office software, Corel could quickly reap the
benefits by expanding its output; doing so would cost Corel next to nothing.
Limits of “Network Effects,” “Tipping,” “Lock-In,” and “Leveraging”
Some authorities worry that the internet may pose a new antitrust concern – the
possibility that network effects may lead to the establishment of global monopolies.  Four
interrelated economic concepts drive these arguments favoring strong antitrust vigilance
in internet markets: network effects, tipping, lock-in, and the leveraging of monopoly
power from one market into others.
Markets in which consumer valuation of a product depends on the number of other
people also using the product are described as being subject to network effects.  A
telephone is of little value if no one else has one; similarly, the Microsoft operating
system would not be as desirable if it only commanded a small percent of the market.
Once the installed client base for a product reaches a certain size,  consumers reason that
it will become the standard and the market “tips” in favour of the dominant product.  At
that point, the market becomes “locked in” to the new standard; superior products may
exist, but unless consumers can coordinate to switch to the alternative product, the
existing standard will remain dominant.  The owner of a standard can then “leverage” its
existing monopoly to erode competition in other markets.36
37 Ad ditionally, as so ftware is a durable good , a firm mus t compete with its own existing product bas e –
cons umers can  always choos e to continue using older versions o f the software.  The digital monopolist can
never res t o n its  laurels; it co uld q uickly find  its elf with a 100%  share of a market with  no sales .  
38 McHugh (2003).
39 Note  also Lieb owitz and Margolis  (1999).
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We have reason to be wary of network effects arguments favoring strong antitrust
enforcement activity.  Even if a firm’s product has achieved total market dominance, its
market power remains rather limited.  Should the firm seek to exercise market power, it
could encourage entry.  Given low marginal costs of distribution once the fixed costs of
development have been paid, a rival can quickly establish a network by essentially giving
away the initial version of its software and recouping its fixed costs through later sales of
upgrades.37  
The “leveraging” argument is equally suspect.  Some critics of Microsoft have claimed
that Microsoft has leveraged its Windows monopoly into the browser market.  By
integrating its browser into the Windows software, Microsoft is alleged to have
foreclosed the market to competitors.  Of course, customers preferring Netscape or other
browsers can simply (and frequently costlessly) download alternate browser software.
However, the argument suggests that customers are simply too lethargic to search out
alternatives to the software already provided with the computer.  If we take the
leveraging argument seriously, we should also worry that Microsoft is attempting to
extend its reach into the market for search engines.  Users mistyping an internet address
in Microsoft’s Internet Explorer are quickly routed to Microsoft’s own search engine to
assist them in finding their website.  However, Google is the search engine of choice on
the internet, not MSN Search.  Microsoft provides no links to Google on its desktop, nor
does Internet Explorer automatically link to Google, but almost eighty percent of internet
searches are conducted using Google’s engines.38  Microsoft exerts as much “leveraging”
to push customers to its MSN Search product as it does to push customers to use its
browser.  Internet Explorer passes the market test and MSN Search doesn’t; “leverage”
doesn’t enter into the equation.39  
Even were we to grant for the moment the argument that network effects can lead to
locked-in monopolistic markets, the question of remediability quickly comes to the fore.
Paul David, the foremost proponent of “lock-in” based theories of market failure,
40 David (2002).
41 See Cowen, Ty ler and Eric Crampto n, ed s .  2002a.  Mark et Failure or Success: The New Debate. 
Oakland, CA: The Independent Institute.
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suggests comprehensive measures delaying adoption of any technological standard in
order to ensure that the right path is set upon before path dependence sets in.4 0  However,
it is quite unclear that such delays could survive cost-benefit analysis.  While the benefits
are only probabilistic and depend critically on the delay actually resulting in the adoption
of a more efficient standard, the costs of delay are certain – they must consist of the
discounted value of the network benefits that would have accrued during the period of
delay.  And, we have no reason to believe the most efficient standard can be chosen
outside of a market discovery process.41
Precisely because networks and product familiarity are valuable to consumers, a well-
working market will supply these valuable aspects.  But it is perverse then to conclude
that the market has failed because the successful supplier of a network or of an especially
high degree of comfortable product familiarity could, if it chose, raise its prices and
restrict its output for a time.  Of course it could; such ability is an inevitable consequence
of success at pleasing consumers in these ways.  (If a firm were unable, even in the short-
run, to raise its price even slightly without losing significant market share, then this fact
would mean that consumers attach no or only minuscule value to the network or to
product familiarity.)
However, ability to raise prices above costs in the short-run (and to increase short-run
profits) does not imply that the firm has real monopoly power.  If a firm refrains from
exploiting consumers today with higher prices because this firm worries that doing so
would cause consumers to shift their patronage to other firms tomorrow, then, in our
view, this firm is no monopolist.  A genuine monopolist behaves monopolistically. A
firm that doesn’t behave monopolistically, even though it might be able to do so for a
time, is a firm that is foolish or altruistic or fearful of rivals’ responses.
Government policy need not concern itself with foolish or altruistic firms; the former
write the script of their own doom and the latter are agents of philanthropy (for as long as
their shareholders’ wealth and good-will last).  Nor should government concern itself
42 Boudreaux, Donald J. an d Burton W . Folsom. 1999. “M icrosoft and Stan dard  Oil: radical les sons  for
antitrus t reform” The Antitrust Bulletin (Fall).
43 Our recommendation accords  with Richard Eps tein’s principle that complex worlds  are bes t governed by
s imple rules .  See Eps te in, Simple Rules for a Complex World  (Harvard  Univers ity Press , 1995).
44 Liebowitz, Stan J. and Stephen E. Margolis . 1999. Winners, Losers and Microsoft: Competition and
Antitrust in High Technology. Oakland, CA: The Independent Institute.
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with firms fearful of rivals’ responses, for such firms are competitive, even if no
currently existing competitor is on the scene.
A general principle applies here, which is this: the best evidence of monopoly power is
the actual exercise of monopoly power – most notably, raising prices and restricting
output.  Reality provides very few, if any, actual examples of firms achieving sustained
monopoly power – as evidenced by harm to consumers (rather than to competitors) –
without government-enforced barriers to entry.  The ratio of fears of monopolization to
actual monopolization is quite high.42
Because history supplies so few examples of the successful private achievement of
monopoly power, a sound rule is to require evidence of actual price hikes and output
restrictions as necessary (although not sufficient) pre-conditions to launching antitrust
actions.43  Such a rule will eliminate much of the anti-competitive uses of antitrust that
mar its history without significantly increasing risks to consumers of suffering
exploitation by a monopolist.
This rule is especially appropriate for the Web and other industries that enjoy exposure
world-wide.  The number of actual and potential competitors is immense, as are
competitors’ sources of financing. All it takes is one among millions of people familiar
with the Web to have a creative idea on how to serve consumers better than the currently
dominant firm is serving consumers.  The larger the market, the larger the pool of
creative talent and entrepreneurship available to keep it competitive and dynamic.
The network features of this market do not necessarily work against the forces of
competition.  Of course, it is precisely the difficulty of imagining the massive
coordination necessary to replace one network with another that makes competition in
such markets seem unlikely.  But the empirical evidence gathered by Liebowitz and
Margolis shows that competition among actual networks is remarkably robust.44
45 Boudreaux and Crampton (2003) discu ss  the importance of personal stakes and individual decisiveness .
46 148 F.2d at  443.
13
Reflection shows that these empirical findings should not be as surprising as they might
at first appear.  Competition in network economies occurs at the level of the network.
Precisely because the gains from becoming the “dominant” network supplier are so large,
the competition to become this supplier will be unusually intense.  Entrepreneurs and
investors have every incentive to search for ways to displace the currently “dominant”
firm – and, knowing this fact, the currently “dominant” firm has every incentive to keep
its prices and product quality as attractive as possible to consumers.
Of course markets might fail. No entrepreneur in the world might recognize the potential
for profit.  Or even if several cash-strapped entrepreneurs do recognize the potential,
every single investor worldwide might refuse to finance any such ventures. But so, too,
might political and legal processes fail to detect the true state of the market.  Indeed,
politicians, bureaucrats, and judges are much less likely to make sound decisions about
such markets than are entrepreneurs and investors.  The latter specialize in taking the
pulse of, and in investing, in specific markets; the former specialize in legal and political
endeavors.  Moreover, entrepreneurs and investors put their own wealth at stake on the
actual outcome of their decisions; government and judicial functionaries have a much
less personal stake in the whatever antitrust decisions they make.45
IV.  Who Rules the Web?  
In Alcoa, Judge Hand found as “settled law” that “any state may impose liabilities, even
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and that these liabilities
other states will ordinarily recognize.”46  While this ruling certainly facilitated the
prosecution of anticompetitive behaviour beyond America’s borders, it raises a
dangerous precedent.  There remain very few activities that some state does not
reprehend, and all are now a mouse click away from every jurisdiction in the world.  The
47 ICPA C (2000), p. 292.
48 The FTC held a pub lic worksh op on s tate impediments  to E-Commerce in October of 2002.  Comments
from that worksh op are available at http://www.ftc.gov /opp/ecommerce/anticompetitive/index.htm .  See
also FTC (2002).
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other papers in this volume provide excellent resources on the implications of this for
free-speech and other important matters.  
The consequences of Hand’s decision, and the extension of the economic effects rule to
jurisdictions encompassing the vast majority of the world’s production and trade, will
prove damaging to e-commerce and to the internet.  Antitrust remains a highly politicized
part of economic policy, and history suggests that antitrust legislation frequently serves
to protect domestic firms from foreign competition.  As e-commerce increases global
competition, pressure for increased antitrust activism against foreign firms seems likely
to increase.  
The International Competition Policy Advisory Committee warned against this use of
antitrust in its 2000 “Final Report.”  As Committee Co-Chair Rill suggests, “the threat of
seriatim balkanization of e-commerce by multiple, inconsistent, and uncoordinated
national regulators threatens economic growth and can be used to impair competitive
entry and expansion.”47  Guarding against this type of state activity has become a matter
of increasing concern for the FTC.  Indeed, the FTC has begun urging individual states to
remove protectionist barriers against internet competition.48   However, such actions are
much more difficult against foreign states.  Much as the United States uses anti-dumping
provisions to protect domestic interests ranging from logging to steel, so too can foreign
jurisdictions launch spurious antitrust complaints against American companies
threatening their firms through internet-based competition.
In many cases, foreign antitrust complaints against e-commerce firms will be relatively
minor.  For many small countries, ability to enforce antitrust remedies against e-
commerce firms may be limited to prohibiting those firms from legally dealing with
residents of the country.  For instance, a small country’s antitrust agency will have a
difficult time enforcing a remedy calling on a foreign Fortune 500 company to divest
portions of its business, but it may be able to shut the firm out of its markets.  And, while
shutting the firm out may actually be the goal of these actions, the negative consequences
49 See Muris, 2001.
15
of such actions will largely fall on the imposing jurisdiction.  In such cases, antitrust
provides a way of protecting domestic firms from foreign competition without falling
afoul of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or World Trade
Organization (WTO).
More troubling are cases in which the litigating jurisdiction is capable of enforcing its
remedies on firms outside its borders.  Among jurisdictions with the power to
extraterritorially enforce rulings, the ruling of the most restrictive jurisdiction is likely to
prevail.4 9   Traditional protectionist mechanisms have been quite limited by comparison;
while countries have been able to impose tariffs on products crossing the border, they
have not been able to force actual restructuring of industries abroad.  While the EC could
impose tariffs on the imports of American aircraft, they could not dictate the structure of
the American aircraft manufacturing industry.  The economic effects rule in international
antitrust provides that ability.  
Of course, countries will be somewhat constrained in applying explicitly protectionist
extraterritorial remedies.  Extraterritorial enforcement hinges on the agreement of the
company’s home country; absent that cooperation, enforcement action is limited to
preventing the offending firm from selling its wares within the jurisdiction.  If cases like
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas arise too frequently, cooperation between the US and EC on
antitrust matters will deteriorate considerably and clawback and blocking statutes will
again become the norm in international antitrust.  However, not all cases involve such
prominent and well-connected firms.  
Because e-commerce allows local consumers to route around the rents earned by local
monopolies, we can expect firms whose rents are in danger to lobby strenuously for their
protection.  If antitrust authorities employed a pure efficiency standard and if political
considerations were never a part of antitrust analysis, this would pose little threat to the
e-commerce firm.  Unfortunately, the world is not nearly so benign.
50 Note Janow’s (2003) caution, however: the W TO may be too  broad an ins titution to s uccessfully deal
with competition policy.  The International Competition Network may be the more suitable body .  Janow
(2003) provides  co gent analys is.  
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What’s to Be Done?
Given antitrust’s long history of abuse, along with an even longer history of markets
proving to be remarkably adept and creative at protecting consumers from private
monopolies, any proposed antitrust treatment of cyberspace should be examined
skeptically.  What forms of international antitrust might be best able to withstand
skeptical examination, given the practical reality that governments will exercise some
form of antitrust scrutiny over cyberspace?
Harmonization is one option, but one that we emphatically oppose.  Harmonization, by
its nature, eliminates jurisdictional competition – which would be especially ironic for
antitrust.  Even without interest-group pressures that might bias antitrust rules away from
protecting consumers and toward protecting politically influential firms, harmonization’s
success requires that the single standard chosen and applied interjurisdictionally be
sound.  If it isn’t – if those who select the standard err when doing so – the lack of
alternative, competing antitrust regimes makes discovering the single-standard’s
weaknesses unlikely.
Multilateral accords among national governments present another possibility for
providing global antitrust regulation.  One advantage of this approach is that much of the
institutional structure is already in place in the form of the WTO.50  The multilateral trade
agreement put into effect by signatory nations through the WTO can be supplemented
with a chapter dealing with antitrust issues.
Specifically, we encourage signatory governments to agree to an origin-based policy of
regulation.  That is, governments should agree that the antitrust policy applied in any
particular instance is the policy of that jurisdiction, and only of that jurisdiction, in which
the defendant firm has the greatest substantive presence.  The location of the firm’s
headquarters is a good candidate for establishing greatest substantive presence, although
alternative criteria – such as country of incorporation – are available.  The particular
criterion chosen for establishing greatest substantive presence is less important that
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adopting such a policy that will shield international firms from the uncertainty of being
subject to myriad agencies enforcing different, often conflicting, antitrust policies.  And
such an approach will maintain jurisdictional competition among antitrust regimes – a
result that antitrust enthusiasts should vigorously applaud.
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